14 Cicero, De Amicitia 20
Laelius defines friendship as an “accord” (cōnsēnsiō) in all things, and it is nature’s greatest gift to humans because it brings so many advantages (opportūnitātēs).
| 1 | …Est enim amīcitia nihil aliud nisi omnium dīvīnārum hūmānārumque rērum cum benevolentiā et cāritāte cōnsēnsiō; |
| 2 | quā quidem haud sciō an, exceptā sapientiā, nihil melius hominī sit ā dīs inmortālibus datum. |
| 3 | Dīvitiās aliī praepōnunt, bonam aliī valētūdinem, aliī potentiam, aliī honōrēs, multī etiam voluptātēs. |
| 4 | Bēluārum hoc quidem extrēmum, illa autem superiōra cadūca et incerta, posita nōn tam in cōnsiliīs nostrīs quam in fortūnae temeritāte. |
| 5 | Quī autem in virtūte summum bonum pōnunt, praeclārē illī quidem, |
| 6 | sed haec ipsa virtūs amīcitiam et gignit et continet, |
| 7 | nec sine virtūte amīcitia esse ūllō pactō potest. |
| 2 | cum benevolentiā et cāritāte: cōnsēnsiō is not enough by itself, friendship also requires benevolentia and cāritās.
quā: an ablative of comparison with nihil melius (3); note that this relative appears at the start of a sentence; what kind of relative? what is its antecedent in the previous sentence? haud sciō an: an introduces an indirect question “whether (or not)”. Each word in the sentence is positioned for a (Latin) reason but it can make the sequence of words difficult to recognize: if we were to recast it in a more “Englished” order, we would have: quidem haud sciō an (exceptā sapientiā) nihil sit melius hominī hāc (= cōnsēnsiōne). Because Cicero wants to connect the thought to what came before, he uses a connective relative, quā, in place of hāc and places the connected relative first in the sentence, where it must appear. exceptā sapientiā: an ablative absolute; note how it appears at the start of the clause it modifies (the indirect question introduced by haud sciō an). |
| 3 | sit: why subjunctive? (hint: think about an in line 2).
aliī…aliī: Laelius lists the other competitors for what is best in life. voluptātēs: Laelius the Stoic has a particular bone to pick with those who follow the Epicurean philosophy and make pleasure the chief “good” for humans; for Laelius this would make humans no better than animals (which Epicureans indeed saw as the best model for human behavior); the Stoics make wisdom (which is the same a virtue) the chief good. |
| 4 | hoc…illa: hoc refers to the closest item (pleasure) while illa refers to the other things in the preceding list.
extrēmum: here, like summum, “the utmost” posita: in the passive ponō -ere frequently means “to depend (on)”. |
| 5 | quī: the grammatical antecedent of a relative pronoun often appears later in a sentence (illī).
praeclārē illī quidem: Understand the same verb repeated from that relative clause (pōnunt) here as well. |
| 7 | ūllō pactō: “in any way way”; the ablative pactō (< paciscor, “to agree, contract”), has an idiomatic meaning similar to ratione or modo, “manner, way, means.” |
Interrogata
- Would you place friendship higher than those other goods in the list? Really?
- What is wrong with pleasure as a good according to Laelius? Do you agree?
